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No. 20150755-CA
INTHEUTAHCOURTOFAPPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,

Plaintiff/Appellee

v.
RAAEL REYES-GUTIERREZ,

Defendant/Appellant.
~

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
Reyes-Gutierrez' opening brief argued that the trial court clearly erred in
~

finding that the City did not intend to provoke Reyes-Gutierrez into moving for a
mistrial. It argued that the objective facts and circumstances in the record
~

indicate that the City sought to secure a mistrial so that it could retry ReyesGutierrez under circumstances more favorable to conviction. It further argued
that double jeopardy barred Reyes-Gutierrez' second trial. In response, the City

~

contends that the trial court correctly found that the City lacked intent, and that
the trial court's finding should not be disturbed. For the reasons set forth in the
opening brief and in this reply brief, the City is incorrect. This reply brief does not
restate arguments from the opening brief or address matters that do not merit
reply. See Utah R. App. P. 24(c) ("Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any
new matter set forth in the opposing brief.").
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case distills to whether the trial court made a clearly erroneous finding
of fact at the June 29, 2015 motion hearing. The City contends that it did not. As
Reyes-Gutierrez argued in his opening brief, a review of the entire record
indicates that the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous.
The following objective facts and circumstances reveal the City's intent and
are addressed below. First, the City was admittedly unprepared to rebut a defense
of mistake and moved for mistrial and belated admission of 404(b) evidence.
Second, the City's proffered discovery testimony from the prosecutor was
improper and irrelevant, and an available alternative non-party witness could
have testified that the City did not receive a working surveillance video. Third,
despite the trial court's ruling in favor of the City allowing it to call prosecutor
Simmons as a witness, the City nonetheless stipulated to a defense mistrial before
the motion was made. Finally, the City's relies heavily on the prosecutor's later
testimony to the City's intent, but those statements of subjective intent are not
dispositive. Indeed, the City wanted a mistrial to create more favorable
conditions for a conviction at a second trial.
Thus, the trial court's finding of fact was clearly erroneous. Accordingly,
Reyes-Gutierrez respectfully requests reversal of his conviction, and a remand to
the trial court for dismissal.

2
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ARGUMENT

I. Objective facts and circumstances in the record show that the trial
court's finding is clearly erroneous and the City intended to
provoke Reyes-Gutierrez into moving for a mistrial.
In light of the "objective facts and circumstances" apparent on the record,
the trial court clearly erred in finding a lack of City intent to provoke a mistrial
motion by Reyes-Gutierrez. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675 (1982).
The City argues that this Court should uphold the finding because the trial court
was in the best position to judge the prosecutor's credibility having heard his
testimony at the evidentiary hearing and presided over the trial. However, even
giving the appropriate "regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the
credibility of the witness," Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)(4), a review of the entire record
should leave this Court "with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed" and that the trial court's finding is against the clear weight of
the evidence. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
As argued in Reyes-Gutierrez' opening brief, the City's statements and

conduct on the record objectively show that the City wanted and intended the
first trial to end in a mistrial. Summarized here, the evidence of the City's intent
to provoke a mistrial includes the City's mid-trial motions for a mistrial and
untimely admission of 404(b) evidence, the City's conduct following the trial
court's denial of the mistrial motion, including its insistence on presenting
irrelevant discovery evidence and failure to even attempt to call a witness who
3
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was not a party attorney, and the City's stipulation to a defense mistrial motion
~

following a favorable evidentiary ruling for the City and before the defense even
moved for a mistrial. In light of the record, the City's contention that the
prosecutor's incongruous post-trial statements negate intent is incorrect. Rather,
the trial court's finding of fact is contrary to the record, inadequately supported,
and clearly erroneous. Therefore, this Court should not defer to the trial court's
finding of fact. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
A. The City moved for a mistrial.

Despite the City's misleading argument in its brief that it "never[]
explicitly move[d] for a mistrial," State's Brief ("SB") 26, it is beyond any
reasonable dispute that the City moved for a mistrial during the May 26, 2015
jury trial. 1 This is an objective and persuasive indicator that the City wanted the
first trial to end in a mistrial. But this is not the only objective fact that
demonstrates the City's intent. The City admitted that it was surprised by ReyesGutierrez asserting a mistake defense, R. 496, it had not provided the requisite
notice to Reyes-Gutierrez that would allow the City to use prior convictions to

See, e.g., R.420 ("the City's thought is that either a mistrial should be declared
based on the fact that evidence was put in front of the jury that changes
essentially the whole landscape where the defendant is claiming without an
opportunity to be cross examined ... that this was human error); R.423 (denying
the City's motion for a mistrial); R-430 (trial court finding that the City may not
object to Reyes-Gutierrez' motion for a mistrial because they had already moved
for a mistrial); R.486 (prosecutor Simmons testifying that "after moving for a
mistrial on the ... issues of opening statement" and having that motion be
denied, he purportedly no longer wanted a mistrial).
1
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et...

rebut the defense of mistake, id., and because the City was constitutionally
~

prohibited from calling Reyes-Gutierrez as witness against himself, it was the
City's belief that it was entitled to a mistrial. R. 419-20.
The trial court denied the City's mistrial motion and the motion to admit
404(b) evidence without proper notice. R. 423, 490. Without another avenue

through which it could have remedied its deficient preparation for trial, including
to rebut the defense of mistake, the City engaged in a strategy that it was wellaware would provoke a mistrial motion from Reyes-Gutierrez.
B. The City proffered irrelevant testimony from the litigating prosecutor

instead of pursuing alternative means to admit evidence of the nonworking
surveillance video.
Reyes-Gutierrez was put in a position where the City prosecutor would
09

improperly and avoidably testify as to a discovery issue at his trial. The City
contends that it could not reasonably have anticipated adversarial crossexamination about missing evidence. SB 18-21. And that "other options were
explored but were ... simply unworkable." SB 19. However, viable alternatives were
available to provide testimony explaining the lost or nonworking video and the
deficiencies in the officer's investigation. Further, the City contends that it was
the sole objective of the prosecution to put forward "accurate" information about
the status of the unavailable surveillance footage. SB 17-21. The City's assertions
are not supported by the record.
First, despite knowing that the surveillance footage was important

(j)

evidence that was missing, the City concedes that it had not prepared pretrial to
5
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meet the cross-examination about evidence it could not produce at trial. SB 1821.

It is undisputed that the City was on notice that highly relevant and material

evidence in this case, i.e., video footage of the alleged crime, was unavailable and
unobtainable before the first trial. SB 19. By the City's own admission, prosecutor
Simmons knew of the nonworking video several days before trial, tried to access
the video footage, contacted Wal-Mart about the non-functioning video, enlisted
the assistance of a property crimes detective, and asked another attorney at the
prosecutor's office for assistance in viewing the surveillance footage. R. 428, 436.
Clearly these actions show that the City was well-aware that this was relevant,

~

material, and significant evidence. Otherwise, such efforts would not have been
expended on trying to retrieve the missing evidence. Yet, despite these hours'
worth of work, the City now claims that trial counsel was surprised that a
criminal defendant would ask probing questions on cross-examination about a
lack of evidence.

~

Indeed, the prosecution asserts that cross-examination about the missing
evidence "risked seriously jeopardizing the credibility of the City's case" and that
cross-examination about the missing evidence implied that "the investigation and
trial preparation was sloppy and mishandled." SB 18. Put simply, the City was
concerned that the cross-examination would create reasonable doubt in the
jurors' minds, which was precisely the point of the line of questioning about the
missing video. Cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (noting
that the prosecution's case is subject to "the damaging potential of [defense]
6
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cross-examination").
Furthermore, the City called a Wal-Mart asset protection associate as a
witness at trial. R. 367. The witness testified that he viewed the alleged theft
through the video surveillance system. R. 376-77. It is unreasonable for the City
to claim that the jury would not question where the video was. The City could
have filed a pre-trial motion in limine to address whether the video could be
referenced at trial, but failed to do so. The City also failed to object to the line of
questioning. Indeed, the City's provocative conduct became more obvious after
the parties learned from jury questions that the jurors noticed the lack of video
and wished to view it.
Second, the City contends that it was improper for a defendant to cross
examine a police officer about the thoroughness of his investigation, and that
discovery evidence was relevant at trial. SB 17-19. The City contends that defense
counsel's questioning regarding the video was intended to mislead the jury into
thinking that the video was withheld from the defense. SB 18. The trial court
disagreed with the City about the appropriateness of this line of questioning. R.
427. The testimony elicited was that Wal-Mart has the ability to record

surveillance footage, footage of this particular event was recorded, a disc of that
recording was made, and neither of the City's two witnesses brought a copy of the
disc with them to trial on May 26, 2015. Id. As discussed in Reyes-Gutierrez'
opening brief, counsel's line of questioning and opening statement were
appropriate. And even prosecutor Simmons admitted that defense counsel did
7
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not elicit misleading or inaccurate information during cross examination, and the
defense never suggested that the video was not provided to them. R. 497-500.
The City claims that defense counsel's questioning made relevant not just
that the City had received a nonfunctioning video, but that the nonfunctioning
video was provided to the defense. See SB 18-19. As discussed in Reyes-Gutierrez'
opening brief, the City's proffered testimony that a nonworking disc had been
provided to the defense was not relevant to any fact at issue. Opening Brief 26-27.

~

Put simply, the City wanted to testify to the discovery process during a criminal
trial. See R. 487 ("It also was very important to [the City] to present evidence to

~

the jury that [] the defense had everything that [the City] had."). But discovery
was not a relevant issue to place before the jury. See Utah R. Evid. 401 ("Evidence
is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining
the action."). Thus, the City proffered irrelevant evidence that it claimed could
only be presented through improper testimony from the litigating prosecutor.
Even if the non-discovery portion of the proffered evidence were necessary, the
City's failure to secure an available alternative witness shows that testimony from
the prosecuting attorney was inappropriate under the circumstances.
Third, there is no indication that the City attempted to secure testimony
from any alternative witness. The City acknowledged during the May 26, 2015
trial that there were several other witnesses who could provide testimony about
the status of the video and were not actively litigating the case during the trial.
8
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~

See, e.g., R. 417, 429. The City's claim that only the prosecutor and defense
attorney could testify that the non-functioning disc was supplied to the defense
ignores the reality that such discovery evidence was irrelevant to the jury's
determination at trial. The potentially relevant issue was whether the City
received a working video, and there were a number of non-party witnesses who
could have testified. For example, prosecutor Simmons admitted that the officer
was able to testify that the video did not function. R. 490. The City's alleged
justification for not using the officer's testimony is that he couldn't testify about
the discovery matters. See R. 490. Thus, contrary to the City's contention on
appeal, there was at least one available alternative witness to testify to the
nonworking Wal-Mart surveillance video.
The City cites Brown v. Louisiana to justify its alleged need for testimony
on the video's discovery to the defense. 447 U.S. 323, 334, (1980). Yet Brown v.

Louisiana is a case affirming a defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict in a
serious criminal case, and has nothing to do with whether the City may call its
own prosecuting attorney as a witness to an irrelevant issue at trial. See id.
The City contends that testimony from the prosecutor was permissible
because it was the "final reasonable option." SB 23. The City's argument is
unavailing, because it ignores the record that the City made no attempt to secure
an alternate witness to present its desired testimony. Although the prosecutor
orally listed potential alternate witnesses before the trial court, there is nothing in
the record to show that the City made deliberate attempts to bring any of those
9
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potential witnesses to trial. The City's reliance on Torres and Watkiss &

Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), is misplaced. Rather, those
cases and others cited in Reyes-Gutierrez' opening brief show that the City
needed to make attempts to secure a non-party witness in order to show that the
prosecutor's testimony was the only option.
The City cites United States v. Torres for the proposition that a party
attorney may testify at trial if alternative means were explored but were merely
unworkable. SB 22-23; 503 F.3d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1974). However, the City
ignores that Torres states that "[s]itting at the counsel table constitutes sufficient

~

participation in the trail as to permit the calling of the prosecutor only if and
when a proper foundation has been laid for impeachment and all other sources of

possible testimony have been exhausted." 503 F.3d at 1126 (emphasis added).
Case law emphasizes the particular danger of allowing a prosecutor to testify as a
witness at trial. People v. Donaldson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 916, 929 (Ct. App. 5th Cal.

~

2001) ((noting that "[j]udicial condemnation of the 'practice of serving as both
prosecutor and witness' has deep roots not only in English and American law but
also in Roman law.") (citation omitted); see United States v. Prantil, 764 F.2d
548, 553 (9th Cir. 1985) (explaining that a prosecutor should not testify in a case
he is actively litigating to "prevent[] the prestige and prominence of the
prosecutor's office from being attributed to testimony by a testifying
prosecutor"). In sum, the law does not allow a party attorney to testify when that
is merely the most convenient option - the City must actually attempt to secure
10
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ij!)I

an alternate witness and it failed to do so here.
Finally, despite the City's arguments to the contrary, Reyes-Gutierrez never
objected to the City putting on testimony about how the evidence was lost or why
that evidence could not be produced at trial. R. 427,431, 434-35. ReyesGutierrez' objection was based on the City's attempt to offer evidence about
whether a disc was provided to the defense and to offer that evidence through
attorneys who had litigated the case. R. 427, 438. The City's arguments that
calling an attorney as a witness would have been permissible under these
circumstances are incorrect, as discussed supra.
C. The City stipulated to a mistrial following an evidentiary ruling in its favor
but before Reyes-Gutierrez made his motion for a mistrial.
~

Even after the City received a favorable ruling from the court, allowing it to
offer prosecutor testimony on a discovery issue, the City nonetheless stipulated to
a mistrial. The City's stipulation to a defense motion for a mistrial at this point,
before Mr. Reyes-Gutierrez even made a motion, indicates that the City wanted a
mistrial. At this point, the City knew that the favorable ruling would provoke
Reyes-Gutierrez to move for a mistrial, that the court would grant the motion
with the City's stipulation, and that the City would have a second opportunity to
file a motion in limine to stifle defense counsel's cross-examination, and to admit
404(b) evidence. The additional evidence available to the City at a later trial
would create conditions more favorable to conviction. See United States v.

Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1422 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Evidence of prior bad acts will
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always be prejudicial."). The City's stipulation to the mistrial before ReyesGutierrez made his motion persuasively demonstrates an "intent on the part of
the prosecutor to subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause." Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676.
The City contends that the trial court's stated opinions that the parties
were "doing their best to address fast moving issues" and were attributing ''black
shadows" that were not there is dispositive. SB 28-29. However, the trial court's
finding of fact is not infallible, and the trial court's opinion does not negate the
facts and circumstances apparent in the record that the City tried to get a

~

mistrial, failed, and then made strategic decisions to provoke Reyes-Gutierrez
into moving for a mistrial. See State v. Kourbelas, 621 P .2d 1238, 1240 (Utah
1980) (stating that a trial court's findings "are not to be regarded as so infallible
as to be beyond the possibility of error"). The City's failures to anticipate a
defense of mistake and timely file notice to introduce evidence of prior bad acts,
followed by the City's refusal to explore and secure alternative means to present
evidence on the missing video, created a situation where Reyes-Gutierrez was
forced to choose between adversarial counsel testifying against him (putting the
jury in a position of judging counsel's credibility), and foregoing his right to be
tried by the first jury sworn. As discussed supra, the City created this situation to
provoke Reyes-Gutierrez into moving for a mistrial, undermining state and
federal double jeopardy protections.
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~

D. Prosecutor Simmon's statements at the motion hearing do not negate the

City's intent to provoke a mistrial.
The City relies on the prosecutor's testimony as to his subjective intent in
its argument to uphold the trial court's finding of fact. SB 25-27. Although
prosecutor Simmons testified at the June 29, 2015 motion hearing that he did not
intend to provoke a mistrial, the prosecutor's subsequent assertions of his
subjective state of mind do not negate the City's clear intent that the first trial end
in a mistrial. As discussed supra and in defendant's opening brief, the
prosecutor's testimony is contradicted by the objective facts that the City
admitted it was unprepared to counter a mistake defense, wanted to offer prior
bad acts evidence in an attempt to cure its lack of preparation, and stipulated to a
defense mistrial motion before the defense moved for a mistrial and following a
favorable evidentiary ruling for the City. See supra, Part I.A-C.
As other courts have noted, it would be inherently problematic to rely

entirely on the claims of a prosecuting attorney, because it would be almost
unthinkable for a prosecutor to admit forming an intent to induce a mistrial. See

State v. Parker, 707 S.E.2d 799, 802 (S.C. 2011) (noting that determining a
prosecutor's subjective intent from his or her assertions alone is not "an easy task
to undertake, because it is almost unimaginable that a solicitor would admit that
he or she took certain actions in an effort to cause the defendant to move for a
mistrial"). So while the testimony from one of the prosecutors who litigated the
first trial may be considered, a denial from the prosecutor who litigated the trial

13
~
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in no way ends the inquiry into whether the City's intent was to goad ReyesGutierrez into moving for a mistrial.
In sum, the objective facts and circumstances surrounding the first trial
show the City's intent to provoke Reyes-Gutierrez' mistrial motion and
demonstrate the clear error in the trial court's finding to the contrary. See
Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676. The prosecution moved for a mistrial when the court
~

denied its untimely motion to admit evidence of defendant's prior bad acts, and
then undertook a course of action that goaded defendant into moving for a
mistrial. In light of the entire record, the trial court's finding was erroneous.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed supra and in his opening brief, Reyes-Gutierrez
asks this Court to reverse and remand his case to the trial court for dismissal
because Reyes-Gutierrez' retrial violated state and federal double jeopardy
protections.

SUBMITI'ED this~ay of August, 2016.

' ~isA G. STIRBA

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

~
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